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Using The United States Coast Guard to Send Drunken




Harbors and Navigation Code § 655 (amended).
AB 979 (Leach); 1997 STAT. Ch. 23
I INTRODUCTION
When the summer begins many people enjoy heading to the nearest water for
a day out on the boat. However, boaters who drink too much alcohol jeopardize
boating safety and increase the potential for accidents. Boating under the influence'
is becoming a problem on waters around the United States and in California.2 In
fact, "alcohol is a greater factor in accidents than the statistics might show.' 3 These
grim findings have led states to enact tougher boating while intoxicated or boating
under the influence laws.4 Chapter 23 is California's effort to tighten up boating
under the influence laws.5 Chapter 23 employs the use of the U.S. Coast Guard to
help California Peace Officers make arrests for misdemeanor boating violations.6
1. Boating under the influence and boating while intoxicated will be used interchangeably.
2. See David Bauder, Boaters Are Sobering Up About BWI Laws, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), May 28,
1996, at B2 (stating that in 1995 there were 181 arrests in New York for boating under the influence versus only
62 arrests in 1991); William E. Gibson, Bill Targets Drunken Boaters, Pilots-House Measure Would Stiffen
Penalties, Bankruptcy Rules, SUN-SENTINEL Fr. LAUDERDAL.E, June 5, 1996, at A3 (noting that Florida leads the
country in boating fatalities and that about half of the fatalities involve alcohol); Phil Mulkins, Holiday Boaters
Rarely Willing to FloatAlone, TULSA WORLD, May 26, 1997, at A2 (relating figures received from the Lake Patrol
that each year there are at least 10 deaths and 50-60 injuries resulting from accidents where alcohol was involved);
Douglas P. Shuit, Boating Injuries on the Rise, L. A. TIMES, May 12, 1997, at BI (reporting that while deaths from
boating accidents may be down, the number of accidents on California waterways are at a record high); id. (noting
that in 1996 there were "850 accidents, 537 injuries and 56 fatalities" actually reported in California and that many
more go unreported).
3. See Bauder, supra note 2, at B2 (citing a report done by the New York State Parks Department); see also
Shuit, supra note 2, at BI (reporting that 39% of the boating fatalities in California in 1996 were attributable to
drinking).
4. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 12:7-70 (West Supp. 1997) (stating that New Jersey has updated its legislation
to reflect the seriousness of boating while intoxicated); see generally ALA. CODE § 32-5A-191.3 (Supp. 1996);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-395 (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 327.35 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997) (laying out the
respective states' boating under the influence laws).
5. SENAT' FLOOR, ANALYSIS OFAB 979, at I (May 23, 1997).
6. See id. (stating that the purpose of the amendment to California Harbor and Navigation Code § 655 is
to allow California Peace Officers to use information provided by specified U.S. Coast Guard personnel to establish
reasonable cause to make a warrantless arrest).
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Although boating under the influence is becoming a larger problem, the U.S.
Attorney's office has not made prosecuting drunken boating violations a priority,7
thus creating the need to prosecute boaters under the state judicial system in
California.8 Chapter 23, according to the Department of Boating and Waterways,
could result in approximately 200-300 arrests per year.9
I1. THE LEGISLATION
A. Existing California Law
California law provides that a person "under the influence of alcohol or drugs
or a combination of both, shall not operate or manipulate any vessel, water skis,
aquaplane, or similar device in a dangerous or harmful manner."' 0 A person is
considered to be under the influence when his or her blood alcohol concentration
is 0.08% or higher." Violation of section 655 of the Harbor and Navigation code
is a misdemeanor.t2
Also under existing law, in order for a California Peace Officer'3 to make an
arrest for a misdemeanor, he or she must either have a warrant, or if making a war-
rantless arrest, must have reasonable cause to arrest and the misdemeanor must have
been committed in his or her presence.14 But often the misdemeanor boating under
the influence offense is not committed in the California Peace Officer's presence.
Therefore, to arrest the intoxicated boater, an exception to the presence rule was
necessary.' 5
7. Id. at 2.
8. Id.
9. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMITTrEE CoNCuRRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS OF AB 979, at 2 (June 2,
1997) (noting that the U.S. Coast Guard gave the Department of Boating and waterways the figure of 200-300
arrests per year).
10. CAL HARB. & NAy. CODE § 655 (West 1978 & Supp. 1997). But see id. § 655(e) (West Supp. 1997)
(excepting from the statute those persons who are participating in a narcotic treatment program as specified in the
statute).
11. Id. § 655(c) (West Supp. 1997).
12. See SENATEFLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 979, at 2 (May 23, 1997) (stating that under existing
law it is a misdemeanor to operate a vessel, water skis, aquaplane or similar device under the influence).
13. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 830 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (defining Peace Officer as any person
who comes within the provisions of Chapter 4.5 of the Penal Code and meets all standards imposed by law).
14. See id.§ 836(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997); SENATEFLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 979, at 2 (May 23,
1997); see also infra note 19 and accompanying text (defining and discussing reasonable cause).
15. See infra Part nI.C.1 and accompanying notes (discussing the presence rule).
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B. Current Legislation
Chapter 23 creates an exception to existing law regarding warrantless arrests. 6
Chapter 23 allows a California Peace Officer to arrest a boater violating sections
655(b), (c), (d), or (e) of the Harbors and Navigation Code without having the
boating under the influence committed in his or her presence. 17 This is done by
using information 8 received from a specified officer of the U. S. Coast Guard as the
basis for establishing reasonable cause.' 9 The California Peace Officers may rely
only on information given to them by commissioned warrant or petty officers of the
U.S. Coast Guard who directly observe the offense, to establish reasonable cause
for the warrantless arrest.2" The information obtained from the specified U.S. Coast
Guard officers can be "verbal or otherwise," the real necessity being that the U.S.
Coast Guard officer directly observe the offense.2' Moreover, Chapter 23 is only
applicable to vessels, water skis, aquaplanes, and similar devices on California
waters where there is concurrent state and federal jurisdiction.22
California is not the first state to use the U.S. Coast Guard in this respect.
Delaware has a similar statute allowing local law enforcement to arrest intoxicated
boaters without a warrant based on information supplied by the U.S. Coast Guard.23
In addition, New Hampshire goes farther and defines the U.S. Coast Guard per-
sonnel as peace officers, thereby allowing them to make arrests for the state.24
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (stating the requirements for arrests without a
warrant).
17. Id. § 655(g) (amended by Chapter 23).
18. See SENATE FLOOR. COMMITTEE ANALYsIs OF AB 979, at 2 (May 23, 1997) (stating that information
can be "verbal or otherwise").
19. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (stating that probable cause exists if, under the
circumstances known to the officer, a prudent person would believe an offense has been committed, and that good
faith is not enough); see also People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324, 409, 821 P.2d 610, 656, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 152
(1991) (stating that, to determine if an officer had reasonable cause, the court must ascertain when the arrest
occurred and what the officer knew and whether that knowledge was adequate to establish reasonable cause);
People v. Fein, 4 Cal. 3d 747,752,484 P.2d 583,586,94 Cal. Rptr. 607, 610 (1971) (stating that reasonable cause
is determined on a case by case basis); People v. Ingle, 53 Cal. 2d 407, 412-413, 348 P.2d 577, 581, 2 Cal. Rptr.
14, 17 (1960) (defining reasonable cause as the "state of facts that would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence
to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion of guilt of the accused").
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 655(g) (amended by Chapter 23); SENATE CoMMrrrEE ON PUBLtC SAFE'TY,
CommrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 979, at 2 (May 20, 1997).
21. CAL. PENALCODE§ 655(g) (amended by Chapter23); see ASSEMBLYCOMMrITEEONTRASPORTATION,
COMMITE=E ANALYSIS OFAB 979, at 2 (Apr. 14, 1997) (stating that the specified U.S. Coast Guard personnel who
directly sees the offense and informs a California Peace Officer only needs to establish that the boater operated the
vessel while intoxicated, not make the actual arrest).
22. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, CONCURRENCE IN SENATE AMENDMENTS OF AB 979, at 1-2 (June 2, 1997).
23. See DEL_ CODE ANN/. tit. 23, § 2126 (Supp. 1996) (detailing arrests without warrants under the Navi-
gation and Waters title of the code of Delaware to include arrests based on information received from U.S. Coast
Guard active duty personnel); cf VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-81, 29.1-205 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997) (expressly
giving the U.S. Coast Guard the authority to make the arrest).
24. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 270:48 (1987 & Supp. 1996); see id. (defining "peace officer" to include the
U.S. Coast Guard).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS REGARDING THE PRESENCE RULE OF
PENAL CODE SECTION 836
A. Background to the Rule
Currently under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution, which is modeled after the
Fourth Amendment, an arrest without a warrant cannot be made unless the arresting
officer has probable cause to make the arrest.25 Moreover, the "presence rule"
required under Penal Code section 836 was derived from the common law of
arrests.26 The strict common law rule required that, for a warrantless misdemeanor
arrest to be valid, the misdemeanor must have been committed in the arresting
officer's presence and there must have been a breach of the peace. 27 The broader
common law rule merely required that the officer have probable cause.28 California
combines both of these rules by requiring that the misdemeanor be committed in the
officer's presence and that the officer have probable cause for the arrest.
29
Nevertheless, the California Legislature made exceptions to Penal Code section
836, which codified the common law presence rules.30 The Vehicle Code section for
driving under the influence creates an exception to Penal Code section 836.31 The
Supreme Court of California even commented that if the legislature wanted to make
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; CAL. CONST. art I, § 13.
26. See Raymond Kurtzman, Casenote, 25 S. CAL L. REV. 449, 450(1952) (noting that under common law
an officer could arrest without a warrant if the misdemeanor was committed in the officer's presence); see also
Street v. Surdyka, 492 E2d 368, 370 (4th Cir. 1974) (noting that a Maryland statute requiring the misdemeanor be
committed in the officer's presence follows the common law).
27. Kurtzman, supra note 26, at 450.
28. See id. (noting that the probable cause came from the standard for felony warrantless arrests), Califomia
courts use the phrase "probable or reasonable cause," indicating that reasonable cause is the same as probable cause.
See Ingle, 53 Ca]. 2d at 414, 348 P.2d at 581, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 18 (using the phrase "probable or reasonable cause"
when referring to Penal Code § 836); see also People v. Roland, 270 Cal. App. 2d 639, 644, 76 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75
(1969) (using "probable or reasonable cause" when referring to California Penal Code § 836).
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997); see Kurtzman, supra note 26, at 449-450 (noting
also that when California Penal Code § 836 was first enacted, it codified the strict common law rule),
30. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.5 (West 1988) (making an exception to California Penal Code § 836 for
assault and battery on school property); id. § 836(c) (West Supp. 1997) (providing an exception to California Penal
Code § 836 for assault and battery committed in a domestic violence situation); id. § 836.1 (West Supp. 1997)
(making an exception to California Penal Code § 836 for assault and battery committed against safety and
emergency personnel); id. § 836.3 (West 1985) (creating an exception for warrantless arrests of those who have
escaped from prison or other forms of police or state custody); see also CAL VF-l. CODE § 40300.5 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1997) (making an exception to California Penal Code § 836 for drunk driving when the intoxicated driver
has been in a traffic accident or has been observed near a vehicle that is obstructing part of the road).
31. See generally CAL. VEt. CODE § 40300.6 (West Supp. 1997) (stating that Vehicle Code § 40300.5 is
to be liberally interpreted allowing for an exception to Penal Code § 836).
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an outright exception to Penal Code section 836 for driving under the influence they
could do so. 32 Therefore, the legislature can implement Chapter 23.
B. The Exception Created by Chapter 23 is Constitutional
Chapter 23 adds another exception to the presence rule of Penal Code section
836 and allows for California Peace Officers to make a warrantless arrest based on
information provided by specified U.S. Coast Guard personnel. 3 The California
Legislature cannot expand California arrest law beyond the bounds of the
Constitution. However, Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence only requires the element
of probable cause for a valid warrantless misdemeanor arrest.34 Therefore, because
the presence rule is only a creature of the common law and not required by the
United States Constitution or the California Constitution, the exception to the
presence rule created by Chapter 23 is constitutional.35
C. How Probable Cause is Established
As noted above, for a warrantless arrest to be valid under the United States
Constitution and the California Constitution, the arresting California Peace Officer
must have reasonable cause to believe a person has committed an offense.
36
Reasonable cause is determined by an objective test-would a prudent officer
believe an offense had been committed.3 7 However, reasonable cause can be estab-
lished by information received from official sources or a reliable informant.38
32. See Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 53 Cal. 3d 753, 761-69, 809 P.2d 404,408-14,280 Cal.
Rptr. 745,749-55 (1991) (discussing that the court will read the exception to Penal Code § 836 in the Vehicle Code
literally and that, if the legislature wishes, it can make an exception to the presence rule).
33. SENATE FLOOR, CoMMITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 979, at I (May 23, 1997).
34. See Street, 492 F.2d at 371 (finding that in a situation where there was a Maryland statute similar to that
of California Penal Code § 836 and a misdemeanor had not taken place in the officer's presence, the Constitution
only requires probable cause for a valid arrest); see also People v. Trapane, 1 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 10, 13, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 423,425 (1991) (stating that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors
committed outside the presence of the arresting officer); 4 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW
Criminal Procedure § 1928 (2d ed. 1996 supp.) (stating that federal law does not require that a misdemeanor be
committed in the arresting officer's presence); CALTFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE §52.21
(Anne Harris, ed., 3d ed. 1996) (stating that a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed outside the arresting
officer's presence is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment).
35. See Trapane, 1 Cal. App. 4th Supp. at 13, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 425 (stating that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed outside the presence of the arresting officer).
36. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; see also CAL- CONST. art , § 13.
37. See Henry, 361 U.S. 102 (stating the test for reasonable cause); see also discussion supra note 19
(discussing, in depth, the test for reasonable cause).
38. See People v. Lee, 275 Cal. App. 2d 827, 832, 80 Cal. Rptr. 491,495 (1969) (noting that information
received from other police officers is an official source); People v. Estrada, 234 Cal. App. 2d 136, 152,44 Cal. Rptr.
165, 175-76 (1965) (noting that police officers can rely on information received from official sources); People v.
Schellin, 227 Cal. App. 2d 245, 25-1, 38 Cal. Rptr. 593,597 (1964) (holding that information received by one police
department (an official source) from another is presumed reliable).
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Because the U.S. Coast Guard has the authority to make arrests (like police
officers) for boating under the influence under federal law they could be considered
an official source.39 Accordingly, under Chapter 23, a California Peace Officer
could use information from a commissioned, warrant or petty officer of the U.S.
Coast Guard to establish probable cause.
IV. POSSIBLE CONCERN OVER WHETHER THE U.S. COAST GUARD IS A PEACE
OFFICER AS DEFINED UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW
There could be a problem with Chapter 23 in that the specified officers of the
U.S. Coast Guard do not have "peace officer" training.40 However, Chapter 23
merely empowers the designated officers of the U.S. Coast Guard to give infor-
mation to California Peace Officers regarding events that they have directly ob-
served.4' The indicated U.S. Coast Guard personnel are not given express authority
by Chapter 23 to arrest an intoxicated boater under California law, nor does Chapter
23 require the specified U.S. Coast Guard personnel to make an arrest.42 Chapter 23
only requires that they provide information, therefore it should not matter that U.S.
Coast Guard Personnel have not had peace officer training. 3 Moreover, the U.S.
CoastGuard has said that it will make itself available to appear in court if necessary
to verify the reasonable cause." Thus, because the U.S. Coast Guard personnel do
not have to make the actual arrests, they do not have to be peace officers under
California law.
V. CONCLUSION
With the enactment of Chapter 23, boaters on California waters can feel a bit
safer when out enjoying the water. Moreover, Chapter 23 enhances the California
39. 14 U.S.C.A. § 89(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1997) (stating that commissioned, warrant and petty officern
have law enforcement authority as granted to the U.S. Coast Guard, including the authority to make arrests),
40. SENATE COMMITfEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMIrFEE ANALYSIS OF AB 979, at 3 (May 20, 1997); see
CAL. HARB. & NAY. CODE § 655(g) (amended by Chapter 23) (specifying the appropriate officers as commissioned,
warrant or petty officers of the U.S. Coast Guard); see also CAL PENAL CODE § 832 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997)
(listing the training required in order to qualify as a peace officer).
41. CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 655(g) (amended by Chapter 23); see discussion infra note 43 (noting that
U.S. Coast Guard personnel are not given authority to arrest the intoxicated boaters under California law).
42. CAL. HARE. & NAy. CODE § 655(g) (amended by Chapter 23).
43. Id. § 655(g) (amended by Chapter 23); see ASSEMBLY COMMrIEE ON TRANSPORTATION, COMMInE
ANALYSIS OF AB 979, at 2 (Apr. 14, 1997) (stating that the specified U.S. Coast Guard personnel who directly see
the offense and inform a California Peace Officer only need establish that the boater operated the vessel while
intoxicated); see also id. (noting that the statute says nothing about requiring the U.S. Coast Guard personnel to
make the actual arrest).
44. See SENATE COMMrrrEE ON PUBLTC SAFETY, CoMMrIE ANALYSTS OF AB 979, at 3 (May 20, 1997)
(stating that the U.S. Coast Guard will cooperate in the state prosecution); see also 14 U.S.C.A. § 141 (West 1990
& Supp. 1997) (authorizing the U.S. Coast Guard to assist a State in performing any activity for which the requested
personnel are qualified).
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Peace Officer's ability to arrest more intoxicated boaters.45 Chapter 23 should
survive any constitutional challenges because the Fourth Amendment only requires
probable cause and that will be provided by the U.S. Coast Guard personnel.
Furthermore, there should be no objection to the fact that the U.S. Coast Guard
personnel are not trained peace officers under California law since the U.S. Coast
Guard merely gives information to the California Peace Officers, and do not make
arrests under the power of California law.
Hopefully, Chapter 23 will help get the message out that California views
boating under the influence as a serious offense. California is tightening up the
boating laws to make certain that the waterways are safe and the number of
accidents and fatalities are reduced.
45. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (estimating the number of arrests under this law).
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Lam, Overcomes Challenge from Lawmakers Resisting
Federal Mandates: "Smoke a Joint, Lose Your License"
Wendy Gable
Code Sections Affected
Vehicle Code § 13202.3 (amended).
AB 74 (Bowler); 1997 STAT. Ch. 5
Vehicle Code § 14907 (amended).
SB 131 (Kopp); 1997 STAT. Ch. 6
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal law mandates that states must either enact laws that require suspension
or revocation of one's driver's license for violation of specified controlled sub-
stance laws or formally declare that the state does not wish to impose such a
sanction.' The penalty for states that fail to choose one of these options is the loss
of federal highway funds, which for California amounts to more than $90 million.2
Although California has enacted a license suspension law,3 current legislation
also declares that California is opting out of the federal mandate.4 These apparently
conflicting laws are the result of a compromise which satisfies both those in favor
of the license suspension law and those who oppose federal mandates.5 This legis-
lative note explains the changes in the California law as implemented by Chapters
5 and 6, and explores the issues on both sides of the controversy.
1. See 23 U.S.C.A. § 159 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring states to enact and enforce a law to suspend cr
revoke for a minimum of 6 months the driver's license of any individual convicted of drug offenses, but providing
that states may formally opt out of enforcing such a law).
2. See id. § 159(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that 10% offederal highway funds are withheld from
states that do not either enact driver's license suspension laws or formally opt out of the requirement to do so); see
also Carl Ingram, Compromise Passed on Drug Crime-Driver License Link, L.A. TiMS, Apr. 11, 1997, at A3
(noting that California was threatened with the loss of approximately $92 million in highway construction and
maintenance funds for failure to comply with the federal mandate).
3. CAL. V.H. CODE § 13202.3 (amended by Chapter 5).
4. 1997 Cal. Stat. ch. 6, sec. I(e), at 19.
5. See Ingram, supra note 2, at A3 (calling the passage of Chapter, 5 and 6 an "unusual political
compromise" that eliminates the perception that the legislature is soft on drug-use penalties while rebuffing federal
intrusions into state lawmaking).
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II. CHAPTERS 5 AND 6
Chapter 5 modifies California's driver's license suspension law which was
enacted in 1996.6 Chapter 5 mandates an automatic six-month suspension of a per-
son's driver's license if that person is convicted of a controlled substance offense.'
The party convicted of the offense need not have been in, or operating, a motor
vehicle at the time of the violation! In addition, Chapter 5 allows courts to consider
whether an individual will experience a hardship due to the suspension of his
license.9 Chapter 5, which expires on June 30, 1999, modifies prior law by adding
a requirement that the person charged with the violation of a controlled substance
law must be notified by the law enforcement officer who arrests him or her, or
issues him or her a notice to appear, of the driver's license sanctions required under
Chapter 5.1o
Chapter 5 appears to comply with the federal mandate that a driver's license
suspension law be enacted; however, California has acted on its own in passing
Chapter 5." This becomes clear when Chapter 5 is read in conjunction with Chapter
6, its companion bill.
12
Chapter 6 reflects the viewpoint that the federal government should not tell the
State how to legislate.1 3 Specifically, Chapter 6 was enacted to tell the Federal
Government that California rejects its mandate to implement a driver's license sus-
pension law.14 Chapter 6 complies with the federal procedures to opt out of imple-
6. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13202.3 (West Supp. 1997) The prior driver's license suspension law was only
operative until March 1, 1997.
7. Id. § 13202.3 (amended by Chapter 5).
8. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMr-rEE ANALYSIS OF AB 74, at 2 (Apr. 11, 1997) (pointing out that AB 74
provides for suspension or revocation of a driver's license upon conviction for any drug offense, whether or not
the offense was related to the use of a motor vehicle).
9. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 13202.3(b)(1), (2) (enacted by Chapter 5) (allowing the court to except
individuals from license suspension or revocation when compelling circumstances such as personal or family
hardship warrant. Hardship may include employment or medically related purposes).
10. Id. § 13202.3(e) (enacted by Chapter 5).
11. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 74, at 2 (Apr. 11, 1997) (noting that AB 74 deletes
reference to state compliance with federal law); see also Jon Matthews, Drug Law Deal Goes to Wilson,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 11, 1997, at A3 (explaining that California is acting on its own in extending the license
suspension law and that the law no longer complies with the federal mandate).
12. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMiTFEE ANALYSIS OF AB 74, at 2-3 (Apr. 11, 1997) (explaining that SB 131
declares that California opts out of the federal mandate, and that AB 74 deletes reference to the federal mandate
while continuing California's driver's license suspension law).
13. See Jon Matthews, Law in Limbo, Highway Funds at Risk, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 11, 1997, at A4
(quoting Senator Kopp, the author of SB 131, as saying "[s]tates should have the right to declare and enact their
own policy without mandate or compulsion of the federal government").
14. See 1997 Cal. Stat. ch. 6, sec. 1(e), at 19 (providing the formal declaration of the Governor and State
Legislature that California does not wish to comply with the federally mandated driver's license suspension law).
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menting a drivers' license suspension law so as to avoid the loss of federal highway
funds. 5
H. CHAPTERS 5 AND 6 REFLECT A NECESSARY COMPROMISE
A recent Gallup poll reflects that drug abuse is the second most serious problem
facing the nation.16 Though we made progress in the war on drugs between 1985
and 1992, since 1992 we have lost ground. 7 One report states that there is a clear
relationship between drug convictions and an increased risk of traffic accidents.
Thus, it makes sense to keep drug criminals from driving.'8 Therefore, it is probably
good policy to maintain current laws which attempt to keep at-risk drivers off the
road.
Some legislators did not want to retreat from the California drivers' license
suspension law because they felt it was an effective tool in keeping dangerous
individuals from driving.' 9 Other legislators strenuously objected to the federal
mandate because the federal government should not tell the State which laws to
enact.20 Chapters 5 and 6 appear contradictory because Chapter 5 extends the cur-
rent driver's license suspension law originally enacted in compliance with federally
mandated law,2' while Chapter 6 declares that California opts out of the mandatory
15. See 23 U.S.C.A. § 159 (West Supp. 1997) (allowing a state to avoid loss of federal highway funds if the
state properly certifies their objection to enacting a driver's license suspension law); see also 1997 Cal. Stat. ch.
6, sec. l(e), at 19 (expressing California's intent to enact a law which conforms with the federal statute in order to
avoid the loss of federal highway funds).
16. See Clay F. Richards, Drug Abuse 2nd on Public's List of Woes, NEWSDAY, Dec. 12, 1995, at A30
(reporting that 94% of Americans polled ranked drug abuse as a "serious or critical problem," and that drug abuse
ran:ed close behind violent crime).
17. See Prepared Testimony of Congressman Joe Barton, FED. NEWS SERV., June 24, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File (noting an overall drop in drug abuse from 23 million users in 1985 to 11.4
million users in 1992, but saying statistics show an upward trend in drug abuse since 1992); see also Rachel L.
Jones, Drug Use by Teens Up 105%, CHARLESTON POST & COURIER, Aug. 21, 1996, at Al (citing government
reports that teen drug use rose 105% between 1992 and 1995).
18. See ASsEmBLYCOmiMTrEEON PUBUC SAFETY, CONSImrEEANALYsIs oFAB 74, at 2 (Feb. 12, 1997)
(citing a January, 1994 report by the Department of Motor Vehicles which establishes a nexus between drug
convictions and an increased risk of traffic accidents).
19. See Matthews, supra note 13, at A4 (articulating arguments in favor of the passage of the "smoke ajoint-
lose your license" law as the means of compliance with the federal mandate).
20. See id. (reporting the conviction of some legislators that the federal government should not mandate stato
legislation).
21. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMITIM ANALYSIS OF AB 74, at 2, (Apr. 11, 1997) (noting that previously, and
until March 1, 1997, California Vehicle Code § 13202.3 was enacted in order to comply with the federally
mandated driver's license suspension law).
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driver's license suspension law.22 However, Chapter 5 does not extend prior law in
such a way as to conform with the federal mandate.'
Chapter 5 continues to provide for the suspension of driver's licenses for
violation of controlled substances offenses,24 but explicitly provides that Chapter
5 may only be enacted if Chapter 6 is also enacted.2 Lawmakers' passage of both
Chapters 5 and 6 was necessary to keep the license suspension law on the books
while attracting the votes of legislators who object to federally mandated laws.26 In
essence, the passage of both Chapters 5 and 6 effects a bipartisan compromise,27
thus satisfying legislators who favor anti-drug measures as well as those who object
to federal interference with state lawmaking.
IV. ISSUES CONCERNING CHAPTER 5
A. Suspension of Driver's License Unrelated to Operation of Motor Vehicle
Opponents of Chapter 5 feel that driving sanctions should be related to driving;
therefore, they do not like the idea that controlled substance violations that occur
even when one is not operating a motor vehicle will result in a licensee losing his
or her driver's license.28 However, the penalty is part of a national anti-drug strategy
which deters the use of illegal substances anywhere, not just in motor vehicles.
29
No California court has interpreted the "smoke ajoint-lose your license" law.30
However, courts from other states have interpreted similar laws.3' Generally, they
22. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (citing the provision in the federal law which allows states
to opt out of the federal mandate and noting that Chapter 6 is California's certification of compliance with that
federal provision).
23. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 74, at 2 (Apr. 11, 1997); see supra note 11 and
accompanying text (documenting that California enacted Chapter 5 outside of the requirements of the federal
mandate).
24. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13202.3 (amended by Ch. 5).
25. See 1997 Cal. Stat. ch. 5, sec. 5, at 18 (specifying that Chapter 5 becomes operational only if Senate Bill
131 (now Chapter 6) is enacted).
26. See Matthews, supra note 11, at A3 (explaining that in order to obtain votes for the license suspension
law from legislators opposing federal mandates, it was necessary to formally oppose the federal mandate and
separately enact a license suspension law).
27. See id. (coining the phrase "bipartisan compromise" to describe the enactment of Chapters 5 and 6
concurrently).
28. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrEE ANALYSTS OF AB 74, at 4 (Apr. 11, 1997) (reporting that opponents of
AB 74 consider the statute irrational and that they therefore criticize the suspension of driving privileges,
particularly since California lacks adequate mass transportation).
29. See Ingram, supra note 2, at A3 (emphasizing that the law is not meant to deter drug use only while an
individual operates a motor vehicle, but is meant to deter the use of drugs anywhere, at any time).
30. See ASSEMBLYCOMMITrEEoNAPPROPRIATIONS, COMMrrEEANALYSISoFAB 74, at2 (Jan. 13, 1997)
(surmising that the reason no one has sued over lack of a nexus between the offense and the punishment is because
of the prior law's sunset date of March 1, 1997).
31. See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text (reviewing state court decisions which have interpreted
laws similar to California Vehicle Code § 13202.3).
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uphold the mandatory suspension or revocation of one's driver's license upon con-
viction of a controlled substance offense unrelated to the use of a vehicle.32 In
Quiller v. Bowman,33 the Georgia Supreme Court held that a statute providing for
the automatic suspension of the driver's license of anyone convicted of possession
of a controlled substance or marijuana was valid. 4 Specifically, the Court con-
cluded the statute was reasonably related to the legislative goals of deterring drug
use, deterring distribution and transportation of drugs, and promoting safe driving.35
In interpreting a law that allowed the revocation of a driver's license for
violation of a controlled substance, the Supreme Court of Florida declared that a
direct relationship need not exist between the type of punishment and the offense
itself.36 The court emphasized that possession of a driver's license is a privilege and
not a property interest.37 California, like Florida, declares driving a privilege and
allows the privilege to be taken away when doing so meets a legitimate state
interest.3 8 The system of licensing and regulating drivers is analogous to the
issuance and regulation of licenses to practice professions, such as law or medicine,
where the government may revoke professional licenses for failure to act
responsibly.
39
Courts have upheld other drivers' license suspension laws when the offense is
not related to driving.4° For example, in Means v. Sidiropolis, t the Supreme Court
of West Virginia upheld a statute that allowed the revocation of the drivers' license
of youths who fail to attend school.42 The court found that while the truancy was not
related to driving, it was evidence that the youth was "irresponsible and more likely
32. See Lite v. State, 617 So. 2d 1058, 1059 (Fla. 1993) (holding license suspension for drug offcnsc
unrelated to operation of vehicle is valid); see also Quiller v. Bowman, 425 S.E.2d 641,643 (Ga. 1993) (holding
that a Georgia law allowing driver's license suspension for violation of controlled substance laws unrelated to tho
use of a vehicle does not violate due process or equal protection clauses of the United States or Georgia
Constitution).
33. 425 S.E.2d 641 (Ga. 1993).
34. See Quiller, 425 S.E.2d at 642 (holding that neither the due process nor the equal protection clauses of
the United States Constitution is violated by a statute requiring the suspension of the driver's license of the person
convicted of possession of a controlled substance).
35. Id. at 642-43.
36. See Lite v. State, 617 So. 2d 1058, 1060 (Fla. 1993) (interpreting Florida Vehicle § 322.055 (1) as
constitutionally valid as a reasonable regulation of an individual right in the interest of the public good).
37. Id. at 1060.
38. CAL. VEH. CODE § 14607.4(a) (West Supp. 1997).
39. See Ellis v. Pierce, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1557, 1562, 287 Cal. Rptr. 93,95 (1991) (comparing disbarment
or suspension of attorneys to protect the public with long range purpose of driver's license suspension, which
protects the public by keeping irresponsible drivers off the road).
40. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (furnishing an example of a statute that provided for
revocation of a driver's license for a reason unrelated to driving, which was upheld as constitutional).
41. 401 S.E.2d 447 (W. Va. 1990).
42. See Means v. Sidiropolis, 401 S.E.2d 447, 452 (W. Va. 1990) (stating that many children profit from
a school environment even if they do not like it, and the intent of the law was to keep adolescents in school).
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to be out making mischief with his or her car., 43 Ultimately, the court found that
conditioning a driver's license on this basis was constitutional.'
Not only have courts upheld laws that suspend a person's driver's license for
reasons not related to the operation of a motor vehicle, but such suspensions have
proven effective in achieving desired behaviors.45 For example, there are statutes
allowing suspension of a driver's license to punish people that refuse to pay child
support.46 As a result of such a statute, an extraordinary number of parents in South
Dakota came forward to make good on their support obligations when faced with
the threat of the revocation of their drivers' licenses.47
Hence, although some California legislators do not like the punishment of
drivers' license suspension under Chapter 5 because they feel the punishment is not
related to driving a vehicle, other similar laws have been upheld as valid and have
shown to be effective in achieving the legislature's desired result.
B. Does Drivers' License Suspension Coupled With Criminal Sanctions
Constitute Double Jeopardy?
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb."48 Although double jeopardy is generally thought of
in the context of criminal sanctions, the United States Supreme Court held in United
States v. Halper 9 that a civil penalty could be considered punishment for double
jeopardy purposes.5°
In Halper, the defendant was first convicted under a criminal false claims
statute.5 On the facts of the criminal case, the Government then brought a civil suit
43. Id.
44. See id. at 451-53 (explaining that West Virginia Vehicle Code §18-8-11, conditioning ajunior driver's
license on school attendance, is a rational method of encouraging education and does not violate substantive due
process).
45. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (supplying evidence of the effectiveness of a driver's
license suspension law designed to impel parents to make good on child support obligations).
46. See S.D.CoDIPIEDLAws § 32-12-116 (Michie Supp. 1997) (allowing the refusal ofissuance ofadriver's
license to a person more than $1,000 in arrears on child support obligations); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 11350.6(e)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1997) (codifying a California law enacted in 1995 that allows suspension of
driver's licenses for parents who fail to meet child support payments).
47. See Fred Bayles, Dead Beat Parents Often Skirt License Revocation, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Mar.
31, 1995, at A21 (noting that 2,500 South Dakota parents executed promissory notes for delinquent child support
when faced with the loss of their drivers' licenses. In addition, $24 million in child support was paid by more than
13,000 parents in Maine after publicity about the revocation of drivers' licenses due to non-payment of child
support obligations).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
49. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
50. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,44849 (1989).
51. Id. at437.
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against the defendant.52 The district court granted summary judgment for the
Government but concluded that imposing the statutory sanctions would constitute
a second punishment, and thus double jeopardy. a The United States Supreme Court
agreed, stating that "Where a defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty
and the civil penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational relation-
ship to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss, but rather appears to
qualitf as "punishment" in the plain meaning of the word" the penalty may con-
stitute double jeopardy.5 Defense attorneys have seized upon the holding in Halper
to raise the issue of double jeopardy in the context of administrative driver's license
suspension (ALS) for drunk driving offenses.55
The argument made by defense attorneys is that an ALS imposed along with
punishment after a separate criminal prosecution violates the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense.56 An ALS occurs at
the time the police officer pulls over the suspected drunk driver.57 When the driver
refuses to take a chemical test, or fails such a test, the police officer confiscates the
driver's license on the spot.58 The driver's license is then revoked by the appropriate
state licensing agency before the driver is tried on the drunk driving charge.59
Although opponents of ALS argue that this procedure violates guarantees against
double jeopardy, most appellate courts hold that the tactic is constitutional. 
6
Those courts which find no double jeopardy exists in the context of ALS hold
that the license suspension or revocation is not punishment, and therefore the
defendant is not punished twice.61 Chapter 5 is similar to laws which authorize
52. Id. at 438.
53. Id. at 438-39.
54. Id. at 449-50.
55. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (explaining the administrative driver's license suspension
process and its Double Jeopardy challenges).
56. See generally Jennifer E. Dayok, Comment, Administrative Driver's License Suspension: A Remedial
Tool That is Not In Jeopardy, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 1151 (1996) (exploring the double jeopardy issue in relation to
administrative license suspensions for alcohol related offenses).
57. Id. at 1155.
58. Id.
59. See David G. Dargatis, Note, Put Down That Drink: The Double Jeopardy Drunk Driving Defense is
Not Going to Save You, 81 IOwA L. REV. 775, 780-81 (1996) (providing overview of how administrative license
suspension laws operate).
60. See id. at 776-78 (delineating the courts that have accepted or rejected the double jeopardy defense for
administrative license suspensions); id. at 777-78 (confirming that at least two federal district courts, one federal
court of apeals and a slight majority of state intermediate and supreme appellate courts have rejected the defcnse):
see also Ellis v. Pierce, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1557, 1562, 282 Cal. Rptr. 93, 96 (1991) (holding that a person is not
subject to double jeopardy when he or she receives both an administrative driver's license suspension and criminal
punishment for the same infraction).
61. See Ellis, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1562, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96 (1991) (holding that an administrative
driver's license suspension is not punishment and therefore does not violate the Double Jeopardy clause). But see
State v. Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d 535, 539 (1995) (holding that administrative license suspension constitutes
punishment imposed in a separate proceeding forsame conduct that is subject of criminal prosecution, and therefore
double jeopardy clause bars criminal prosecution on that charge).
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administrative license suspensions because it allows for driver's license suspension
in addition to criminal punishment for the underlying offense.62 Accordingly,
proponents of Chapter 5 can say that Chapter 5 does not violate double jeopardy by
analogy to ALS under drunk driving laws and can argue that the license suspension
under Chapter 5 is also not punishment.
In the event that a court finds a Chapter 5 license suspension to be punishment,
Chapter 5 can still withstand a double jeopardy argument because, while multiple
punishments for the same offense may constitute double jeopardy,63 courts are
allowed to impose multiple punishments in a single proceeding provided that the
cumulative punishment does not exceed the amount of punishment authorized by
the legislature.' Under Chapter 5, the license suspension is not imposed in a pro-
ceeding separate from the criminal controlled substance proceeding as it is under
drunk driving administrative license suspension laws.65 For this reason a double
jeopardy challenge will likely not succeed.6
V. CHAPTER 6: OPPOSITION TO FEDERAL MANDATES
Chapter 6 was enacted to appease those members of the California Legislature
who are not eager to submit to the control of the federal government and who object
to Congress telling the states which laws to enact.67 The basis of Congress'
authority to mandate certain state legislation is the "spending power," and it allows
Congress to entice states to enact certain legislation by threatening to withhold
federal funds.68
62. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13202.3 (amended by Chapter 5).
63. See Halper 490 U.S. at 440 (explaining that one of the abuses protected by the Double Jeopardy clause
of the U.S. Constitution is multiple punishments for the same offense).
64. See id. at 450 (stating that "[i]n a single proceeding the multiple-punishment issue would be limited to
ensuring that the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by the legislature").
65. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 13202.3 (d) (amended by Chapter 5) (allowing that any suspension of driving
privileges for violation of controlled substance offenses is in addition to (and therefore not separate from) the
punishment for the controlled substance offense).
66. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 449-50 (specifying that the government may impose "both the full civil penalty
and the full range of statutorily authorized criminal penalties in the same proceeding," but the government may not
bring a criminal action against a defendant and "then bring a separate civil action based on the same conduct and
receive a [punitive sanction]"); see also Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 596 N.E.2d 340, 345-46 (1992)
(holding that driver's license "suspension for violation of controlled substance laws follows automatically from
conviction on an underlying drug offense as an ancillary part of the criminal proceedings); id at 346 (reflecting the
view of the Court that "[o]nce the Legislature has specifically authorized two punishments, double jeopardy
principles are not implicated").
67. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (presenting the view of legislators who favor state
sovereignty).
68. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987) (stating Congress may condition the State's
receipt of federal funds on states enacting legislation which Congress may not enact directly).
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The spending power of Congress derives from the Constitution.69 The Supreme
Court decided in United States v. Butler7° that so long as Congress spends for the
"general welfare," there is no limitation that money be spent only to carry out one
of the enumerated powers listed in Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution. 7' If
Congress desires to condition states' receipt of federal funds, it "must do so
unambiguously enabl[ing] the states to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant
of their participation.""
The spending power of Congress allows the federal government to regulate in-
directly what it cannot regulate directly by depriving states of funds." Even though
it would appear that Congress is stepping beyond permissible bounds, the Supreme
Court reiterated in South Dakota v. Dole74 that Congress may persuade states to
enact certain laws by dangling federal money in front of them.7 Furthermore,
federal grants which are conditional on states enacting specified legislation are legi-
timate when they are related "to the federal interest in particular national projects
or programs." 76 When these requirements are met, and so long as no other federal
constitutional provisions are violated, Congress may use its spending power to
induce states to enact laws.'
The federal law that precipitated Chapters 5 and 6 complies with each of these
requirements. 7' First, the drivers' license suspension law promotes the general
welfare because it seeks to deter drug use.79 Next, the federal mandate is unam-
biguous because it says that states must either enact a drivers' license suspension
law o.r formally declare their intention to opt out, and that the failure to exercise
one of these options results in the loss of 10% of that state's federal highway
funds. 80 Further, the fact that California's Legislators knew significant funds were
in jeopardy and acted to prevent the loss of those funds indicates that they received
69. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o lay and collect taxes.... to pay the Debts
and provi de for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; . Money is therefore raised
by taxation, and then spent promoting general welfare and for defense).
70. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
71. See id. at 66 (holding that the power to tax and spend for the general welfare exists as a separate and
distinct power from the other powers enumerated in Article 1, § 8).
72. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hasp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
73. See Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (reiterating that Congress may properly regulate states indirectly
"to further broaden policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient
with federal statutory and administrative directives." (quoting from Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 474 (1980)).
74. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
75. See id. at 206 (discussing whether Congress violated constitutional limits on the spending power by
withholding federal highway funds from states that permit people under the age of 21 to purchase or possess in
public any alcoholic beverage).
76. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444,461 (1978).
77. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09.
78. 23 U.S.C.A. § 159 (West Supp. 1997).
79. See id § 159(a)(3)(A)(i)(l) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that a driver's license will be suspended for
violation of the Controlled Substance Act, which has as its purpose the deterrence of illegal drug use and
trafficking).
80. Id. § 159 (West Supp. 1997).
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the message and thus exercised their choice to opt out knowingly.8' Finally, the
conditions imposed by Congress on receipt of funds are related to the federal
interest in preventing the use of controlled substances. 2 Therefore, while California
legislators are concerned that Congress indirectly mandates the enactment of certain
laws, Congress has acted fully within its power in mandating that states enact a
driver's license suspension law or formally declare their opposition to such a law.
VI. CONCLUSION
Chapters 5 and 6 are proof that parties with different agendas can work together
to establish laws. Chapter 5 continues the California law that requires automatic
driver's license suspension when an individual is convicted of controlled substance
offenses: to do otherwise would be to take a step backwards in the fight against
drugs.83 Although Chapter 5 is modeled after the law Congress would like all states
to enact, Chapter 6 declares that California opts out of enacting the license sus-
pension law, pursuant to federal law.84 By formally declining to enact Congress'
license suspension law, the California legislature has complied with Congress'
requirements and thus ensured that California will not suffer a ten percent reduction
in federal highway funds.85
81. See 1997 Cal. Stat. ch. 6, sec. 1, at 19 (stating failureto comply with federal law would result in the loss
of federal highway funds).
82. See Ingram, supra note 2, at A3 (stating the underlying federal law is an anti-drug law).
83. See supra notes 5-10, 16-19, 21 and accompanying text (reviewing Chapter 5 and the public policy
reasons for enacting it).
84. See supra notes 1, 3-4, 11-15, 20,22,23,68-82 and accompanying text (explaining California's com-
pliance with the Federal mandate by opting out, and discussing the validity of federal mandates such as this one).
85. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (explaining that the failure to comply with the federal mandate
results in a significant loss of federal highway funds for California).

